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This thesis is a case study of the Åland office in Brussels that sets out to analyse its extra-state 
and intra-state channels of influence in use in order to influence European policy- and decision-
making and at the same time try to shed light on how the Åland office circumvent and, on the 
other hand, work in tandem with the central government of Finland. In this respect, the bypass-
theory of the multi-level governance approach will be used to understand and analyse these 
regional paradiplomatic activities both without the state and in tandem with the state. This 
approach will offer elaborate insights into how the Åland office use various channels of 
influence, including lobbying and interregional organisations and networks. In the end this 
study will find that the Åland office is able to bypass the central government by: lobbying and 
creating influence in the European Parliament; forwarding the positions of the Åland 
Government to relevant political players and EU-institutions, organizing or taking part as 
speaker in seminars or conferences; forming direct (both formal and informal) contacts and 
dialogue with officials at the Commission; creating and using ad-hoc groups/networks/alliances 
with cooperating partners; organizing and setting up official meetings with high-profile officials 
and politicians; promoting certain important political goals, values and activities of the Åland 
Government and the Åland community at the wider EU-arena; informal advocacy work at an 
early stage; trying to get access to new important forums at the EU-level; cooperating with 
specific industry interest organisations; and membership and engagement in European 
networks. On the other hand, the Åland office work in tandem with the central government by: 
cooperating with Finnish MEPs and actors supporting the positions of the national government; 
accreditation to the Council, with all its informal and formal advantages; presenting positions 
and taking part and engaging in meetings in the Council and other EU-institutions (the latter if 
in cooperation with officials from national authorities); cooperation between Åland and Finnish 
officials at the EU-level; and influencing the national political agenda in the Council. Finally, 
the thesis concludes that the extra-state channels in use of the Åland office in Brussels - being 
less-institutionalized, more policy-specific cooperation – rather complements formal intra-state 
mechanisms of cooperation and interest representation than the other way around. 
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Regional representations are nowadays a mainstay in the plenitude of actors that have set up 
offices in Brussels with an objective to foster a closer relationship with the European Union 
(EU). A large, and increasing, number of sub-state actors make their presence felt in Brussels 
in order to exert their influence on matters related with the EU, European integration and the 
increasing competencies of the EU (Rowe 2011, p. 1; Huysseune & Jans 2008; Hutchinson 
2020).   
The representative offices of regions in Brussels provide a significant connection link between 
regional interests and EU institutions as well as with cooperation partners and like-minded 
actors. These regional offices are a functional element within EU’s multi-level governance 
structure (Rowe 2011, p. 3). Questions that arises are how a regional representation office in 
Brussels, operating in an environment with an abundance of interest organisations, work and 
which different types of channels it uses when it with or without the state (Tatham 2010) tries 
to affect policy- and decision-making? These rhetorical questions address European integration, 
the mobilisation of regions towards Brussels and the multi-level governance structure within 
the EU.  According to research about regions' and regional representation offices' channels of 
influence, the existing intra-state influence-creating channels that are in use when a regional 
office try to influence EU-matters with interaction with its member state ('with the state') are 
the most important compared to the extra-state channels that are in use when trying to influence 
EU-matters without its member state ('without the state') (see Keating et al. 2015; Tatham 
2010). However, some research also proposes that extra-state channels (the Brussels route) and 
channels of lobbying and paradiplomacy not in tandem with the central government – thus 
bypassing the state – might be as important as intra-state channels (Trobbiani 2019). This 
research puzzle will be at the heart of this thesis.  
Perhaps a paradox the evolution and the substantial increase of regional representations in 
Brussels is the notion that the EU suffers from ‘regional blindness’ (Stephan 2010; Rowe 2011, 
p. 199; Cygan 2014, p. 266; Weatherill 2005, p. 3). However, EU’s blindness towards regions 
and the member states’ internal arrangements might be a rather deceptive assumption (Palermo 
& Kössler 2017, pp. 24). In contrast to the concept of the ‘regional blindness’ in understanding 
the regions’ role in the governance structure of the EU, the multi-governance approach view 
the EU as a single, multi-level polity that allows regions to systematically engage in the 
European policy processes in the different levels of governance, and as a consequence sub-state 
regions have the ability to bypass the state and the central government when trying to influence 
EU-matters (Marks 1993, p 392; Marks et al 1996, p. 169; Hooghe and Marks, 2001; Olsson 
2010, pp. 119, 125). The academic discussion whether or not regional governments actually 
engage in and successfully use this process of continuous negotiation and represent their 
interests at the EU arena (Högenauer 2014, pp. 451-452) is still very much active. 
In this regard, when studying regional representation offices and multi-level governance in the 
EU, legislative regions1 are particularly interesting cases (Högenauer 2014, pp. 452). This can 
be motivated by; a) these regions can be expected to have more impact at the European level 
 
1 For the purposes of this study a definition of a ‘region’ focus on regions with legislative competencies (a region 
with lawmaking authority and with a working regional Parliament and a Government) in the EU. Therefore, this 
study defines ‘legislative regions’ as politically elected intermediate levels of government in EU member states, 
which have legislative autonomy in a number of policy areas affecting that territory (Rowe 2011, p. 9-10). 
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compared to solely administrative regions, b) as European integration has led to a transfer of 
legislative competences from regions to the European Union, these regions with legislative 
authority have a strong propulsion to affect European legislation and policy-making in order to 
balance the power, and c) legislative regions have more channels of interest representation to 
choose from (compared to administrative regions) as their constitutionally guaranteed 
possibilities grants them the ability to also use intra-state channels (i.e. through the national 
government) when trying influence EU matters (Ibid). 
There is moreover a lack of research looking at regional interest representation in concrete 
cases (Högenauer 2014, pp. 452). Due to the lack of research looking at regional interest 
representation in concrete cases as well as the difficulty to provide comparative or large-scale 
research on how regions bypass the central government and how they work in tandem with 
the central government – or the prominence of these two ways – it is important to deal with 
these issues in a case study of a regional office in Brussels. 
 
Åland’s office in Brussel is an interesting case of how a region with strong identity and 
constitutional status effectively try to influence decision- and policy making at the EU 
institutions in Brussels and at the same time create a channel of information and contact 
between the Åland Government, the Finnish Permanent Representation in Brussels, and the 
institutions of the EU and external actors. The Åland case is even more interesting when 
considering that the special adviser of the Åland office in Brussels is accredited to the Council 
of the European Union (the Council) and the office is embedded within the Finnish Permanent 
Representation to the EU. The only other regions that are part of the EU that has officials 
accredited to the Council are the German Länder (Självstyrelsepolitiska nämndens betänkande 
1/2018-2019). An important aspect is also that the Åland office and the Government of Åland 
is very small in size and resources compared with its counterparts at the EU-level (Ibid). Åland 
is moreover one of very few legislative regions in the EU with strong constitutional status (both 
within the member state and within international law) that operates within a member state 
(Finland) that is not a federacy but instead applies an asymmetrical governance structure.  
1.2. Aim and research questions 
According to the multi-level governance approach, regions (and regional representations) can 
and will mobilize beyond the control of the central governments directly in the EU arena 
(Hooghe & Marks 2001; Keating et al. 2015). One elementary hypothesis that can be drawn 
from this understanding is that there will be direct interaction between regional actors and EU 
institutions unmediated by central governments (Högenauer 2014, p. 453; Keating et al. 2015). 
This ‘bypass-theory’ of the multi-level governance approach holds that regions can bypass their 
central governments in order to reach their policy goals at the EU level (Olsson 2010, pp. 119-
121; Keating & Hooghe 2001).  
In short, by analysing Åland Government and Åland’s Brussels office textual reports, this case 
study2 will use an analytical framework based on the multi-level governance approach and its 
‘bypass-theory’ as defined by for example Olsson and others (Olsson 2010; Tatham 2010), in 
order to differentiate the intra-state and extra-state channels of influence, and the analyse how 
 
2 The research in this thesis is a part of a larger research project in cooperation with the Åland Peace Institute. 
The research project is a collaboration between the Åland Peace Institute and ÅSUB and is about the 
significance of EU membership for Åland and to the people of Åland. 
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the Åland office in Brussels in certain politically prioritized matters bypass the central 
government as well as work in tandem with central government at the Brussels arena. In the 
end it may be possible to outline if there is any propensity to highlight any of the two above 
ways (or strategies if you like) of bypassing or working in tandem with the central government 
when trying to influence politically prioritized matters at EU level  The scope of the analysis 
will be limited to the time period of the Juncker commission (2015-2019), as the special adviser 
of the Åland office in Brussels got new goals and priorities during this period – focusing more 
on lobbying and less on information gathering (Självstyrelsepolitiska nämndens betänkande 
1/2018-2019). Hence the office has a clear political mandate to exert influence decision- and 
policy-making (Ibid).    
Research questions 
The research questions are as follows: 
 
1. By differentiating between intra-state and extra-state channels of influence, how is the 
Åland office in Brussels in certain politically prioritized matters a) bypassing the 
central government and b) work in tandem with central government at the Brussels 
arena?    
2. Can it be perceived (through any obvious or underlying meanings) whether the 
analysed material suggests any propensity of the Åland office to concentrate on either 





2. Theory and previous research  
2.1. Theory   
There are in general three different views on the effects of the EU on regions (or sub-national 
authorities); the EU has a) strengthened regions, b) weakened regions, or c) not substantially 
made any difference (Fleurke & Willemse 2007; Bourne 2003). Proponents of the first view 
(a), for example Hooghe & Marks (2001 & 2003), use the concept of multi-level governance to 
explain the idea that governmental power is no longer centralized within one single actor (e.g. 
the central government), but that it is shared between different actors at different levels. This 
concept (and its theories) is connected with the “hollow state”-thesis. It implies a strengthening 
of the position of regions in relation to the central government because of the opportunities the 
EU offers to regions (Fleurke & Willemse 2007, p. 71). The second view (b) is largely 
constitutional and propose that at least regions with legislative power loose authority and 
autonomy as EU integration “undermines legal and constitutional arrangements guaranteeing 
regional autonomy” (Bourne 2003, p. 59). The understanding that the EU suffers from ‘regional 
blindness’ (Stephan 2010) can be attributed to this view. The third view (c), which is an 
intergovernmentalist approach, holds that in the end, in relation to regions, there are no 
substantial effects of EU integration and stresses the supremacy of the EU member state in EU 
policy- and decision making (Bourne 2003). From the intergovernmentalist perspective, the EU 
is perceived as a highly institutionalized international organization designed to serve the 
purposes of their member states (Scharpf 2010, p. 66). In opposition, there are however several 
scholars that have convincingly argued that the EU remains highly significant for regions and 
vice versa, as regions plays an important and increasing role in implementing, forming and 
directing European integration (se e.g. Elias 2008 and Bienefeld 2009).  
The academic discussion whether or not regional governments actually engage in and 
successfully use the process of continuous negotiation and represent their interests at the EU 
arena (Högenauer 2014, pp. 451-452) is still very much active. Down below, I will further 
discuss the first two views mentioned above through the scope of ‘regional blindness’ and 
‘multi-level governance’. 
Regional blindness – a ‘pessimistic’ view of regional influence in the EU  
It can be argued that any significant mechanisms to institutionalize, or any development of, the 
formal role of regions in the EU since the 90’s has not been achieved (Elias 2008, pp. 485-486; 
Keating 2017, p. 616). According to Cygan (2014, p. 280), regions “remains on the periphery 
of the constitutional and institutional architecture” of the EU in relation to their Member States. 
It is claimed that the Member States of the EU through the Treaties formally leaves out regions 
with legislative power from effectively taking part in the governance structure of the EU 
(Stephan 2010, p. 7, 18), and that this impedes “constitutionally guaranteed competences of the 
regions by virtue of its institutional set-up” (Stephan 2010, p. 18). Among several European 
regions with legislative power and a strong identity, there is thus a notion in some political 
quarters that the EU suffers from ‘regional blindness’ (Stephan 2010; Cygan 2014, p. 266; 
Weatherill 2005, p. 3). It is argued that the Community method of decision-making has 
generally been a “state-centric and centralizing legislative process” (Cygan 2014, p. 266). This 
notion is maybe most visible in some specific regions with special autonomy arrangements 
where there are have been a loss of self-determination and difficult challenges concerning lack 
of direct representation at EU-level. Here the Åland autonomy and the Basque country are two 
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telling examples (Bullain 2008, p. 20-23). The Open Method of Coordination (OMC) as well 
as the subsidiarity principle and the Early Warning Procedure of the Lisbon Treaty (with regard 
to regional parliaments), it is argued, offer little scope for regional authorities extend their 
formal influence (Palermo & Kössler 2017, pp. 19-20; Rowe 2011, p. 8; Pazos-Vidal 2019, 
chapter 8; Cygan 2014). Some scholars even consider the extended rights of the regions in the 
Lisbon Treaty only as “symbolic” (Bauer & Börzel 2010, p. 258). Especially the extent to which 
regional elected parliaments have been restricted in their lawmaking (‘de-parliamentarization’) 
and marginalised in the political processes in the EU, as well as the resulting democratic deficit, 
has been in the forefront of ongoing debate (Schüttemeyer 2009; Rowe 2011, p. 199; Bursens & 
Högenauer 2017; Arribas & Högenauer 2015, p. 133). To tackle the issue of under-representation 
(as there is no EU-wide response), legislative regions have reacted differently depending on the 
mechanisms of regional influence on EU matters within the member state and whether the 
region is represented in the European Parliament with a MEP3.  
The multi-level governance approach  
The multi-level governance approach4 developed mainly as an alternative to neo functionalist 
and nation state-centric models of European integration (Hooghe & Marks 2001; Bache & 
Flinders 2004; Olsson 2010, p. 119). It is from the beginning closely related to specifically 
European governance and European regional policy (Palermo & Kössler 2017, p. 26). Marks 
defines multi-level governance in the EU as “a system of continuous negotiation among nested 
governments at several territorial tiers” (Marks, 1993: 392). The part ‘multilevel’ represents 
here the increasing interdependence of governments of various levels (Palermo & Kössler 2017, 
p. 26).   
 
Multi-level governance is not only a normative paradigm but could also be used as a description 
of how the EU works and how it accommodates the member states’ regions increasing salience 
(Pazos-Vidal 2019). According to Pazos-Vidal (2019, pp. 1-3), the paradigm of multi-level 
governance – and the complementary principle of subsidiarity – have been more or less 
integrated in the EU integration process since their formation with the signing of the Maastricht 
Treaty. Indeed, it is a fact that the EU’s institutional balance includes a wide range of informal 
and formal structures and institutions that regions can take part in, and sub-state regions have 
taken advantage of new channels of lobbying, networking cooperation and formal participation 
at the EU-level which have opened up EU policy- and decision-making to influence from 
regional authorities. Several developments have benefited the regions’ participation and ability 
to apply influence on EU policies and decision-making, for example; the provisions of the 
Maastricht Treaty and the Lisbon Treaty have increased the formal channels of which 
(especially legislative) regional authorities can take part in, (Bomberg & Peterson 1998; Tatham 
2008; Cygan 2014; Arribas & Högenauer 2015, p. 134),  
 
Even though no ‘Europe of the Regions’ has emerged to constitute a ‘third level’ (Jeffery 1997; 
Bauer & Börzel 2010, pp. 255-260), regions do get access to important channels that they can 
use in attempts to influence the EU policy processes (Tatham 2008, p. 511; Elias 2008, p. 487). 
Thus, the EU remains highly important for regions, and regional politics in the union plays an 
important part in shaping the nature and direction of European integration (Elias 2008, p. 487).  
 
3 It can here be noted that whether a territorial autonomy enjoys representation in the European Parliament 
depends on the electoral system of the member state at hand.  
4 The multi-level governance approach was primarily developed by Hooghe and Marks in the early 1990s. 
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Bypassing of and working in tandem with the state   
The strength of the multi-level governance approach, in case of regional influence, is that it 
includes the possibility of regional actors to be “entrepreneurial” and to form direct 
communication channels, networks and interest alliances with other actors within the 
framework of the EU. Regions (including regional representation offices) can continuously 
mobilize beyond the control of the central governments directly in the EU arena (Hooghe & 
Marks 2001). Thus, there will be direct interaction between regional actors and EU institutions 
unmediated by central governments (Högenauer 2014, p. 453; Keating et al. 2015, p 452). Both 
regions and EU institutions (e.g. the Commission) seeks these direct links to each other (Berglof 
2002, pp. 112-116). This understanding – part of the wider multi-level governance approach – 
can be referred to as what Olsson defines as the ‘bypass-theory of regionalism’5 (Olsson 2010, 
p. 119-121). This bypass-theory has been elaborated extensively in academic research on ‘new 
regionalism’ (Olsson 2010), for example by Keating & Hooghe (2001). The bypass-theory, 
with roots in early functionalist theory of European integration, holds that functional linkages 
would increasingly bypass the nation-state, but admitting that the state still has a great deal of 
power (Olsson 2010, p. 120; Keating 1995; Keating et al. 2015). Put in other words, regional 
para-diplomatic activities (formal and informal) sometimes bypass the central governments of 
EU member states (Tatham 2010); hence, the central governments of member states are no 
longer the sole players in foreign affairs and negotiations at the EU level (Tatham 2008, p. 511; 
Ansell et al. 1997, p 363; Marks & Hooghe 1996, p 90).  
 
The debate whether regions increasingly bypass the central government or whether the state is 
still an efficient gatekeeper has however settled into the understanding that, “far from being 
mutually exclusive, bypassing and co-operation [with the central government] are 
complementary strategies which different SSEs [sub-national entities] employ in different 
measures” (Tatham 2010, p. 77). Nonetheless, it is often argued that regional influence at EU-
level is seldom powerful without cooperation with a national government, and regional offices 
in Brussels tend to work together with their national government to achieve common policy 
goals “much more frequently than bypass it” (Keating et al. 2015, p. 454). Tatham (2010), 
studying bypassing paradiplomacy (understood as substate interest representation without 
interaction with its member state) and co-operative paradiplomacy (understood as sub-state 
interest representation in cooperation with its member state), similarly finds that strong 
autonomous regions are more prone to co-operative paradiplomacy as they are in a more 
favourable “position to influence their central government and hence have less of an incentive 
to bypass it” (Tatham 2010, p. 83). Tatham argues that the degree of devolution and party 
politics constitute an influential role in determining the prevalence of cooperation and 
bypassing (Ibid). Some scholars argue that mainly those regions which are peripheral and have 
few channels of access to their central government use the bypass-option frequently (Arter 
2001).  
With regard to regional offices in Brussels, Bauer & Börzel 2010 (p. 258) holds they provide 
the regions with an effective and direct entrance into EU policy- making, and “they tend to take 
the form and function of lobbying organizations rather than political representations”. While 
the offices “hardly present a threat to the gate-keeping position of the central state in EU policy- 
making” (Bauer & Börzel 2010 p. 258), they can nonetheless bypass the government of the 
central state through informal channels as they work with mitigating the effects of EU-decision 
 
5 Further on in the study the theory will be referred to as the ‘bypass-theory’  
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making and the process of EU integration. Examples of when regional offices bypass the central 
government includes; trying to get MEPs to defend certain positions, taking part in Commission 
consultations, approaching Commission officials, or organize lobbying events or participating 
in events (e.g. conferences or meetings) that are designed to inform and influence EU matters 
at the EU level (Högenauer 2014, p. 454). Bypassing is not happening when participating in the 
Council of Ministers, COREPER, Council working groups or Commission committees as it 
normally requires the permission of and the agreement of a common national position with the 
national government (Ibid).  
Arguing for the use of the multi-level governance and the bypass-theory of 
regionalism  
The ‘multi-level governance’ approach, and the theories connected to it, are contested in the 
academic literature (Hooghe & Marks 2001, 2003; Piattoni 2010) due to its many definitions 
and the difficulty in its operationalization (Bache & Flinders 2004, p. 4). Specifically, there is 
criticism whether the concept and theory of multi-level governance provides the normative, 
ontological or analytical tools needed when trying to understand the complete role of regions, 
and their influence, in Europe (Keating 2017, pp. 621-622; Keating 2008, pp. 75-76). Similarly, 
as is the case with intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism, the bypassing-theory of the 
multi-level governance approach probably cannot capture the complete picture of “the 
emerging, multiscalar order in Europe” (Keating 2017, p. 621). Multi-level governance and the 
bypass-theory have also been criticized for not paying enough attention to the intra-state 
environment of sub-state regional authorities, which according to several scholars (as we will 
see in following chapters) plays an important role as a catalyst for sub-national mobilization 
(Greer 2006). However, this problem has often been dealt by scholars using the multi-level 
governance approach by including intra-state channels in analysis of regions’ and regional 
offices’ interest representation in Brussels (se for example the recent studies by Antunes & 
Magone 2020 and Antunes & Antunes 2020).  
 
Despite the above criticism, a serious amount of research based on multi-level governance and 
regional bypassing has yielded clarity regarding the regional and national dynamics in the EU 
(Antunes & Magone 2020, p. 221; Olsson 2010). According to Bienefeld (2009), for example, 
the multi-level governance approach and its bypass-theory provides new insights into 
examining the phenomenon of regions’ ‘circumvention’ of their central governments through 
informal representational channels, including lobbying and membership in interregional 
organisations, at the EU-level. It can thus be presumed that regional offices in Brussels – as is 
the case with regions at large – are seeking to take advantage of opportunities to bypass central 
government control and establish their own direct channels of communication with key actors 
at the European level. 
This study assumes that the EU influences the decision-making of regions with legislative 
power, and vice versa, to a fairly large extent, both in a direct manner and in an indirect manner 
(Fleurke & Willemse 2007, pp. 85-86; Trobbiani 2019, pp. 187-188, 195-196). A second 
assumption is that the EU constrains regional decision making while also enhancing it in other 
areas – i.e. the EU can create opportunities and enhance regional decision-making but can also 
constrain regions’ decision-making through the Treaties and EU-legislation (Fleurke & 
Willemse 2007, pp. 85-86). In line with this logic this study is based on the assumption that 
regions with legislative power mobilize their resources in order to get access to, create 
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communication channels and exercise influence on EU policy-making and legislative processes 
(Jeffery 2000, p. 3). 
2.2. Previous research 
Regions’ ability to influence policy- and decision-making in the EU  
The increasing level of European integration into the sphere of regional and local area of 
competence has coincided with political decentralisation and the growing political and social 
importance of regions and cities across Europe (Greenwood 2011a, p. 231; Loughlin 1997, p. 
148; Hooghe et al. 2008; Hooghe & Marks 2010, p. 17; Jeffery & Schakel 2013; Jeffery 2008).  
The EU has prompted Member States to transition as it has introduced an “extra-state scale of 
political authority” that “introduces additional multilevel interactions that both respond to and 
bear on changes within the state” (Jeffery 2008, p. 553). Sub-state regions within the EU have 
thus adjusted their strategies, communication channels and priorities to prevailing 
circumstances in a world of multi-level governance in relation to time and space, and they have 
used both ‘intra-state’ and ‘extra-state’ channels, and formal and informal channels, when 
exerting influence on matters of interest depending on the situation (Trobbiani 2019, p. 195; 
Loughlin & Antunes 2020, p. 316; Rowe 2011, pp 8-9;). Regional influence, and the channels 
of influence in use, thus varies depending on the stage in the policy cycle (formulation, 
decision- making, implementation) and on the capacities of the respective regional actors 
(Bauer & Börzel 2010, p. 256). Consequently, the regional strategies for dealing with the EU 
level are based on the internal politics of member states and regions, the level of investment 
into the strategy, and the diverse constitutional, governmental, financial and ideational 
resources that regions have and can muster along the way (Rowe 2011, p. 12). 
 
Concerning regional strategies towards the EU a dividing line can be seen between legislative 
regions and administrative regions (Rowe 2011, p. 81-82). It is more likely that a region with a 
strong constitutional status will be viewing EU integration more pessimistic in core political 
domains compared to regions with only administrative competences. Hence, regions that 
exercise significant constitutional power generally want the emerging EU constitutional order 
to be sensitive to their authority within the member states (Jeffery 2004). They will have more 
thorough EU strategies and channels of influence and will more actively push for change and 
influence at the EU arena compared to administrative regions.  
Antunes & Magone (2020, p. 223), in their analysis of Portuguese regional authorities’ 
mobilization in the EU, concludes that three sets of domestic mediating factors decide the 
degree of influence in EU matters and the channels and rationales that are supporting these 
regions’ strategies in the EU; structural factors (includes the level of authority of the regions, 
the quality of inter-governmental relations and legitimacy issues), agency factors (capacity-
building and regional entrepreneurship) and contextual factors (e.g. impact of the external crises 
such as economic crisis)6. In their analysis it is demonstrated that the two constitutionally 
stronger autonomous regions of Madeira and Azores apply significant more influence through 
their extra-state and intra-sate channels of influence compared with the Portuguese 
administrative mainland regions (Antunes & Magone 2020, p. 237).     
 
 
6 Antunes & Magone (2020) derives their domestic mediating factors from Risse, Cowles & Caporaso (2001, 9–
12); Börzel & Risse (2003, 63–69) and Graziano (2003). 
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There is thus a common notion in the academic research about regions’ influence capabilities, 
that the relative strength of a region within the EU, and its ability to influence EU policies is 
dependent on its pre-existing constitutional set-up within the member state (Palermo & Kössler 
2017, p. 26).  Similarly, it has been argued that the domestic politics perspective should be 
focused on, as intra-state factors which – taken together – explain the extent to which regions 
are more likely to exert their influence in EU policy- and decision-making and establish an 
important role alongside their central government in the relationship with EU (Jeffery 2000, pp. 
11-18).  
Important factors explaining the degree of influence, it is argued, can be attributed to regions’ 
degree of embeddedness within the EU and demographic weight (Keating et al. 2015, p. 453). 
Level of decentralisation, connection to the civil society and cultural traits could also play a 
role in (Tatham 2013; Greenwood 2011b; Tabellini 2007). Jeffery (2000, pp. 11-18), on the 
other hand, attributes four variables whether sub-national authorities are expected to insert their 
influence on European policy processes: 1) constitutional factors (the most important), 2) 
intergovernmental relations, 3) regional entrepreneurship, and 4) legitimacy and social capital. 
Thus, he makes the following propositions (Jeffery 2000 p. 12-17):  
• SNAs constitutionally endowed with extensive internal competences are likely to exert 
stronger influence over European policy than their more weakly endowed counterparts. 
• Formal structures of central–SNA intergovernmental relations are likely to provide 
more effective channels for policy influence than more informal interactions. 
• Effective administrative adaptation, leadership, and coalition-building strategies in 
response to the challenges posed by European integration are likely to improve the 
prospects for influencing European decision-making. 
• The credibility of SNA claims for influence in EU decision-making is likely to be 
enhanced by the perceived legitimacy which SNAs bring with them into the European 
policy process. 
Stephan (2010), studying the cases of Åland Island and the German Länder, upholds that three 
of those indicators are of special importance as “[w]hether participation leads to influence […] 
depends on the constitutional position of regions within their Member States, their interregional 
relations and the degree of regional entrepreneurship exhibited”. The concept of regional 
entrepreneurship is interesting for the purpose of this study (connected to point 3 above) as it 
puts focus on the region itself and the local conditions of the region (Jeffery 2000, pp. 14-15). 
 
According to Keating et al. (2015, p. 453), regional influence in Brussels "is usually confined 
to narrowly circumscribed issues and tends to be the privilege of the larger, politically 
autonomous and resourceful regions” and that research usually shows that "regional influence 
in Brussels is modest”. However, Pazos-Vidal’s analysis (2019) provides evidence how 
regional entrepreneurship can influence EU policy-making by showing how regions “with few 
or no formal privileges at EU level can exert disproportionate influence in the EU decision-
making process over theoretically more powerful actors under the existing institutional 
framework” (Domorenok 2020, p. 2). This argument is especially interesting also in the case of 
the Åland Island and its office in Brussels considering the size of Åland and its extremely small 
office (only one official employed). 
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Previous research about the Åland Islands and the EU – a short introduction 
Studies and reports have dealt with the institutional set-up and legal aspects concerning Åland’s 
relation to the EU. Some of the more important contributions include EU:s behörighet och 
Åland (Jääskinen 2003), EU-rätten och behörighetsfördelningen mellan riket Finland och 
landskapet Åland (Sjölund 2016), Constitutions, Autonomies and the EU (Spiliopoulou 
Åkermark (ed.) 2008), Ålandsprotokollet och EG-rättens icke-diskrimineringsprincip (Sjölund, 
2008), De rättsliga ramarna för vissa autonomiers och mikrostaters förhållande till Europeiska 
unionen (Silverström 2004), and Regional voices in the European Union – regions with 
legislative power and multi-level governance: Perspectives for the Åland Islands (Stephan 
2010). The latter report is perhaps the foremost academic literature that has contributed most to 
our understanding with regard to the channels of influence that are used by Åland’s institutions 
of autonomy. According to the report the formal channels of influence includes the CoR, The 
Åland Parliament’s possibility to use the Early Warning Mechanism (EWM), the Åland special 
adviser to the EU (embedded in the Finnish Permanent Representation), the constitutional right 
of the Åland Government’s officials and ministers to participate in the preparation and 
processing of the Government of Finland’s EU-positions in matters of interest to Åland 
(Stephan 2010, pp 26-49). Stephan (Ibid) maps also informal channels, and includes in this 
category; consultations and meetings with the Commission, cooperation with MEPs and the 
EP, various  networks at the EU-level (such as the Regional Advisory Council for the Baltic 
Sea and CALRE) joined by Åland’s institutions of autonomy as well as associations closely 
linked to the Åland Government. Stephan (2010) argues that the influence that the Government 
of Åland can exert via the channels of influence that are in use to influence EU matters has to 
take into account a) the constitutional position of the region in the Member State, and b) 
interregional relations and c) regional entrepreneurship at the EU-level (Stephan 2010, pp 46-
49). Of the three type of factors, only the first (constitutional factors) strikes high points due to 
the fact that the autonomy of the Åland Islands is guaranteed under the Finnish Constitution 
and under Public International Law (Ibid). As Stephan (2010) mostly focused on the channels 
of influence that the autonomous Åland had access to in more general terms – and not 
specifically the Åland office in Brussels – the thesis you are reading now is a relevant 
complement and addition. Additionally, what is necessary to take into account here, is that when 
Stephan (2010, p. 39) conducted her research, the current Åland office in Brussels was not seen 
as a somewhat independent office; instead the Åland special adviser (or the councillor) to EU 
was seen as an integrated part in the Finnish Permanent Representation and had not that much 
space to actively engage in lobbying activities outside the Council and the Finnish 
representation office. During the last decade, however, the special adviser’s role has evolved 
considerably (Ålands landskapsregering 2015; Ålands landskapsregering 2016). Nowadays the 
Åland flag is also waving outside the Finnish representation office which it did not do back 
then.  
Channels of influence regions use 
At EU-level, formal sources of influence for regions can be found in the realization of 
Maastricht Treaty (the establishment of the CoR as an advisory body and the provision that 
regional ministers could attend the Council of Ministers) and the realization of three key 
principles in the Treaty of Lisbon; including regional and local autonomy and protection of the 
national identity of the member states (Article 4(2) TEU), subsidiarity (Article 5(3) TEU), and 
democracy (Article 10(3) TEU). The Lisbon treaty also introduced the EWM in the Treaty’s 
Protocol on the Application of the Principles of Subsidiarity and Proportionality. Even though 
the regional parliaments are not able participate in the EWM directly, the Protocol (Article 6) 
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states that national parliaments, where appropriate, consult with regional parliaments with 
legislative powers (Ibid). The CoR moreover has gained the competence to appeal to the Court 
of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) for the annulment of an act on the grounds of 
subsidiarity (Arribas & Högenauer 2015, p. 134). These principles above and the 
reinforcements of regional participation do not only result in the fact that the EU needs to 
uphold a relationship  to, and protect the treaty rights of, sub-national authorities, but also entails 
that the sub-national authorities themselves actively participate in the multi-level governance 
structure in the union (Panara 2016, pp. 611-612; Cygan 2014, p. 268; Huysseune & Jans 2008, 
p. 4). This particularly true with regard to regions with legislative power (Cygan 2014, p. 268).  
 
There are quite a lot of research about the channels of influence that regions can use in their 
pursuit of influencing EU policy- and decision-making. Scholars have identified the many 
available channels of influence that regional authorities can use of various efficacy depending 
on the political context and the subject to be pursued (Mazey & Richardson 2001; Tatham 2007, 
pp. 218-224; Tatham 2008, p. 498; 2010; Greenwood 2011a; Keating et al. 2015). Other 
scholars have focused on the objectives pursued by and the activities of regional authorities 
(Rowe 2011; Callanan & Tatham 2014).  
When making their voices heard, legislative regions use the channels of influence available 
through the central state (e.g. the government ministries, the national parliament or the national 
permanent representation to the EU), their regional MEP in the European Parliament (if any), 
formal channels made available by the treaties (e.g. the CoR, subsidiarity checks of regional 
parliaments and the possibility of regional ministers to represent the member state in the 
Council of the European Union), regional offices in Brussels, various lobbying channels and 
inter-regional networks like the Conference of European Regions with Legislative Power 
(REGLEG). 
 
At the most basic level, the two different channels of interest mediation that regional authorities 
can use are a) the ‘national route’ (referred to as the intra-state channel), trying to go ‘with the 
state’, and b) the ‘Brussels route’ (referred to as extra-state channels), sometimes trying to go 
‘without the state’, whether through formal and informal channels, including regional 
representation in EU institutions (Antunes & Magone 2020, p. 223). Important channels in the 
intra-state category are channels through Member States themselves, which includes for 
instance the National Permanent Representation to the European Union and formal negotiations 
between the regional government/parliament and the central government/parliament. 
Concerning extra-state channels, Rowe (2011, p. 51-53) and Tatham (2008) identifies six 
primary extra-state channels in the EU that regions can use to communicate interests and affect 
outcomes:  
- Regional representation offices 
- Committee of the Regions 
- The European Commission 
- The European Parliament 
- The Council of Ministers 
- European networks and associations, such as CEMR (Council of European 
Municipalities and Regions), AER (Association of European Regions), CPMR 
(Conference of Peripheral Maritime Regions), and EUROCITIES, ERRIN (the 
European Regions Research and Innovation Network), EUREGHA (the European 
Regional and Local Health Authorities Platform).  
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On the same subject, Jeffery (2000, p. 16), on the other hand, make a distinction between four 
types of cooperation and coalition-building with external actors which regions can use at the 
EU level:  
• private sector actors (e.g. companies, associations, interest groups etc.);  
• other sub-national authorities within the Member State (e.g. cooperation between 
authorities representing regional minorities or between regions with similar authority 
and status);  
• sub-national authorities in other Member States (e.g. the functional interregional 
associations and cross-border co-operation agreements); 
• EU institutions (e.g. with the Commission, which sub-national authorities have 
periodically struck alliances with, in order to exert influence on central state 
institutions). 
 
Importantly, intra-state opportunities are most often associated with formal national structures 
and channels while extra-state channels normally include both informal and formal channels at 
the EU level (Loughlin & Antunes 2020, p. 313). Bauer & Börzel (2010, p. 258) argues that, 
due to their limited formal access to EU level decision- and policy-making, regions have 
focused on formal intra-state channels when trying to influence EU proposals and policy-
making. Other scholars have also argued that domestic intra-state channels (via the national 
government) are the most important ones compared with those that are formed directly with 
actors at the EU level (Keating et al. 2015, pp. 450-451). Similarly, Jeffery (2000, p. 3) have 
argued that existing influence-creating channels within the member state where regional actors 
can exert influence on EU policies are arguably the most important compared to external 
channels as the central governments in member states are by far the most significant actors 
within the EU. However, it is important to note here that Jeffery has partly shifted stance and 
have acknowledged that too much focus has been state-centric research (Jeffery & Schakel 
2013; Jeffery 2008; Macneill et al. 2007).  
Antunes & Magone (2020) article shows that the autonomous regions of Azores and Madeira 
combine both intra- and extra-state strategies and channels to exert influence in matters 
primarily concerned with ‘regulatory’ purposes. When comparing the five mainland Portuguese 
regions (CCDRs) and the legislative and autonomous regions of Madeira and the Azores 
Antunes & Magone (2020, p. 237) conclude that the intra-state channels are the most important 
as the autonomous regions are the most “active and influential policy actors, acting side-by-
side with the national government”. This perspective on the importance of the channels through 
the member state, and the role of regional representations in Brussels in this model, is illustrated 
by Rowe (2011, p. 5). Rowe (2011, p. 5) – already categorizing the channels in intra-state and 
extra-state channels – also uses a distinction between formal and informal channels that regions 
act within to influence EU decision- and policy-processes.  
 
However, perhaps a contradiction to the focus on formal intra-state channels; due to the 
perceived flaws and inefficiency of several of the official channels available for them to exert 
their influence, regions have developed – many times through their regional offices – various 
alternative lobbying channels, such as inclusion of economic, social and cultural stakeholders 
in the interest representation process and cooperation through thematic interregional networks 
(Greenwood 2011b; Knodt 2011, p. 420; Bouza García 2011; Trobbiani 2016; Trobbiani 2019, 
pp. 185-188). Various networks (both interregional and other types) of interest representation 
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at the EU level can provide chances for regional offices to influence and work on such EU 
policies which are not processed through the CoR or other formal channels (Trobbiani 2019, p. 
188; Keating et al. 2015, p. 454).  
 
According to Bienefeld (2009) studying the case of the Basque country’s influence in the EU, 
the effective capability of legislative regions’ influence at EU-level depends on the formal and 
informal institutional contacts attained. Biemefeld (2009, p. 233) argues that legislative regions 
can combine formal and informal channels to more effectively impact EU policies and 
decisions, and that the effectiveness of the channels is for the most part reliant on two factors: 
a) the regions’ level of expertise and b) their central state’s facilitation of formal 
representational opportunities. Importantly, academic research seem to agree that sub-state 
regional authorities use both intra- and extra-state channels of influence, with the understanding 
that a combination of both in their work will be most beneficial for them (Bomberg & Peterson 
1998, p. 234; Tatham 2007: pp. 218–224; Blatter et al. 2008: 467–8). 
Sub-national mobilisation through the establishment of regional offices   
The cheer number of regional offices in Brussels have increased substantially, and they have 
become important influential players as they have expanded their resources and capacities 
during the last decades (Rowe 2011, p. 7; Greenwood 2011a; Bartolini 2005, pp 260–268; 
Huysseune & Jans 2008; Moore 2006; Hutchinson 2020). This follows the general trend that 
the overall number of Brussel-based organised actors following their interests has increased 
substantially (Coen 2007; Eising 2007). The concept of “sub-national mobilisation” (or regional 
mobilisation), developed by Hooghe (1995), is often used to refer to the general trend of 
increasing regional engagement with the EU and the establishment and increase of regional 
offices in Brussels since the 1990s (Hooghe 1995; Rowe 2011, pp. 3-4, 47).  
According to Huysseune & Jans (2008, pp. 4-5), regional offices have been drawn to Brussels 
for several different reasons, mainly; the search for and access to EU- funding opportunities, 
the expansion of EU competencies and policies into policy areas close to the concerns of (or 
under the authority of) regional government, the institutional openness of the EU, growing 
pressure (both internal and external) to be present in Brussels (e.g. the ‘spill-over’ effect7), and 
possibilities to lobby for regional interests. Additionally, regional representation offices and 
their direct communication links with EU institutions (such as the Commission), have been 
used to increase the regional government’s political leverage, bargaining power and 
information gathering vis-à-vis national authorities thus breaking up the central government’s 
monopolized contacts with European institutions (Huysseune & Jans 2008, pp. 4).  
In explaining the establishment of regional offices in Brussels Marks et al (1996) on the other 
hand emphasize two political explanations that most likely will lead a region to the opening of 
a Brussels office, namely; regions that are most affected by decisions made at the EU-level 
(regional governments with the greatest autonomy or the most extensive political role), and 
those regions that have substantial political demands that sometimes are in conflict with those 
of the central government (i.e. regions with a strong distinctiveness and identity in relation to 
other national regions). Similarly, social movement theory has proposed that regional 
mobilization in Brussels has mainly materialized for those regions with the strongest identities 
and the most institutionalized domestic structure (Olsson 2010, pp. 123-125). Thus, legislative 
regions tend to emphasize regulatory mobilization, while in contrast regions with only 
 
7 i.e. the substantial number of representations in Brussels stimulates and put pressures on unrepresented regions     
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administrative powers generally emphasize financial mobilization (Callanan & Tatham 2014, 
p. 190).  
The ability of regional authorities to bypass the central government has also been put forward 
to explain regional EU-mobilisation. For instance, it has been used to explain the somewhat 
paradox phenomenon of traditionally ‘minority nationalist’ regions, protective of their 
legislative competencies, sometimes are among the most EU-friendly regions (Marks et al. 
1996; Olsson 2010, p. 121). Another popular view of the factors that facilitate mobilisation and 
encourage the establishment and the continuation of a regional representation has focused on 
resource “pull” and resource “push” factors (Rowe 2011, p 55-58, 81-82; Macneill et al. 2007). 
Resource “push” factors indicate pressures from within the domestic arena in the region (e.g. 
constitutional factors or protection of regional interests vis-à-vis the EU), and resource “pull” 
factors indicate external pressures from the EU arena (e.g. EU resources available to regions 
and the ability to influence the distribution of those resources) (Rowe 2011, p 56-57; Macneill 
et al. 2007).  
The activities and channels of influence of regional offices in Brussels 
Regional offices in Brussels serve as important channels of communication and interaction with 
EU institutions and other Brussels-based agencies, and other stakeholders representing regions 
of member states (Rowe 2011, p. 2). In explaining why presence in situ in Brussels is deemed 
important by regions, Rowe (2011, p. 6) points to the fear of missing out on opportunities if not 
fully engaged in European policy-and decision-making and access to EU programmes and 
funding. She also points to the long-term perspective; “[a] presence in Brussels represents a 
foothold in a vibrant network of ideas and involvement in the longer-term development of 
proposals, particularly those which emanate from the European Commission” (Ibid).  
According to Greenwood (2011a, pp. 185-186), the most important goals supporting regional 
presence in Brussels includes, accessing EU funds, lobbying, gathering and providing 
information and cooperating with other regions. There is a set of classic activities which 
represent the majority of any regional office’s work in the EU. According to Huysseune & Jans 
(2008, p. 5), the main activities of these offices can be summarized into four categories: 
information management, networking, liaison between local, and regional authorities and the 
EU, and the influencing of EU policy. Rowe (2011, p. 83-84) instead divides the activities into 
five categories: intelligence gathering, policy interpretation and analysis (‘downstream’ 
activities); representation and lobbying (‘upstream’ activities); networking and co-operation; 
commercial opportunities, partner searches, and funding analysis; and promotional activities 
for the region showcasing culture, goods, tourism and investment opportunities. 
Using channels of interest representation and influencing politically prioritized matters 
constitute an integral part of the activities of regional offices in Brussels.  
 
As we have noticed above, regional offices are most often seen only as one part in the regions’ 
efforts to influence EU policy- and decision-making, and is then categorized as an extra-state 
channel and part of the ‘Brussels-route’ (Rowe 2011, p. 51-53; Tatham 2008; Antunes & 
Magone 2020). What is then forgotten is that regional offices can been seen as an independent 
agent of the regional government (Greenwood 2011b) and the office themselves can use both 
intra-state and extra-state channels of influence, for example when influence through the 
Member States’ central government representation is be available (as is the case for the Belgian 
regions for instance (Huysseune & Jans 2008, p. 7)). As it happens, academic research on the 
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channels of influence that regional offices in Brussels can use specifically are quite scarce. At 
least one notable exception is Trobbiani (2019), who have recently studied the channels which 
is most likely to be used (both individually and through the work of associations/networks) at 
regional offices when trying to influence EU policy-making. In his survey8 he finds that the 
following channels are used the most (from top to bottom): informal meetings with EU policy-
makers, based on Brussels-based networks (avg9 7.94); presenting and circulating position 
papers (avg 7.59); organizing events with the participation of EU policy-makers (avg 7.56); 
informal meetings with EU policy-makers based on nationality (avg 6.90); open consultations 
(avg 6.84); informal meeting with EU policy-makers based on nationality and party politics 
(avg 6.56); European Commission’s expert groups (avg 6.52); through your Committee of the 
Regions representatives (avg 6.31);  European Parliament intergroups (5.94); Council 
preparatory bodies through permanent representations (avg. 5.88); European Parliament fora 
(avg. 5.34); Commission comitology (avg 4.67); and other (avg. 3.80). 
 
What we can see here is that official routes is downgraded and a clear prominence of informal 
contacts and the use of opinion papers. The convergence between territorial and functional 
interest representation, that often has been acknowledged within the multi-level governance 
concept (Greenwood 2011a; Piattoni 2011; Knodt et al. 2011), mean that the activities (and the 
channels of influence) of regional interest representations in Brussels have converged towards 
models of interest representation adopted by other interest and lobbying groups that count on 
the inclusion of like-minded cultural, social and economic actors to support their expertise and 
representativeness (Greenwood 2011b; Trobbiani 2016). Trobbiani (2019, p. 188) finds that the 
inclusion of cultural, social and economic actors in a regional office’s advocacy and lobbying 
activities is an important factor in order to gain credibility and influence in EU policy-making 
as well as to provide EU policy-makers with expert knowledge and first-hand experience on 
the policy fields at stake.  
 
However, as we have noticed above, intra-state influence-creating channels within the 
framework of the Member State where regional actors (including regional Brussels-offices) can 
exert influence on EU policies are by scholars often associated with the most important channels 
for regions compared with those extra-state channels of influence that are formed directly with 
actors at the EU level (see for instance Jeffery 2000; Berglof 2002; Keating et al. 2015, pp. 450-
451). In order to shed some light on this research puzzle this case study will try to contribute to 
our understanding on which route is give more prominence in a specific case and how a regional 
office in Brussels can bypass (i.e. circumvent) its member state and central government as well 
as how a regional office can work in tandem with its member state and central government at 
the Brussels arena. According to my knowledge there are not that much research studying the 
channels of influence of regional offices in Brussels in individual cases. Moreover, in general, 
there is a “scarcity of research looking at regional interest representation in concrete cases” 
(Högenauer 2014, pp. 452). 
             
 
 
8 Compiled in January 2017 by 39 senior officials and directors of service working in 39 regional offices in 
Brussels (Trobbiani 2019; p. 1816). 
9 Average; 1=least likely to use, 10= most likely to use 
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3. Method and material  
 
The main focus is to study the case of the Åland office in Brussels by analysing its current 
extra-state and intra-state channels of influence in use when trying to influence EU policy- and 
decision-making and at the same time try to shed light on how the Åland office circumvent and, 
on the other hand, cooperate with the central government in Brussels. In this respect, the theory 
of bypassing of the multi-level governance will be used to understand and analyse these regional 
paradiplomatic activities both without the state and in tandem with the state. This approach will 
offer elaborate insights into how the Åland office use various channels of influence, including 
lobbying and interregional organisations and networks.  
3.2. Analysing the Åland regional office in Brussels – building an 
analytical framework 
The analytical framework is constructed so that it will first categorize the channels of 
influence10 by the concepts of intra-state (e.g. cooperation with the member state’s Permanent 
Representation or taking part in Council preparatory bodies) and extra-state channels (e.g. 
participation in RegLeg and informal contacts with MEPs) that have been used by the Åland 
office in politically prioritized matters at the EU arena. This will lead to the possibility of either 
bypassing or working in tandem with the central government. If the Åland office bypass or 
work in tandem with the central government, in specific politically prioritized matters, certain 
means will be applied, and specific circumstances will be present (the “how”-question). In the 
end working in tandem with or bypassing the central government in specific prioritized matters 
will lead to at least the possibility of either influencing central government’s position or EU-
institutions’, EU-actors’ and/or other member states’ central governments’ position in those 
matters. During the document analysis textual codes will be linked to any of the two categories 
and then grouped in either the extra-state channel or the intra-state category. Both formal and 
informal channels be taken into account. This construction of the analytical model is in line 
with Loughlin & Antunes’ (2020, p. 313) constructed analytical framework of their analysis of 
regional influence in small unitary states. As such, in the analysis, informal channels will 
encompass for instance informal contacts to MEPs or coalitions and alliances (Ibid), and formal 
channels will encompass for instance representation in working groups in CoR or accreditation 
to the Council.  
When conducting the analysis, there were some cases of ambivalence concerning whether an 
influence-creating activity was part of an extra-state or intra-state channel, and whether if it was 
used in tandem with or bypassing the state. That is perhaps not that strange as it is quite logical 
that several types of influence-creating activities can be used in different ways and in different 
manners depending on the situation. Another important note is that the analytical framework 
and the result of the analysis are not really saying anything automatically about whether the 
position of the Åland Government/Åland office is in opposition or aligned with the central 
government’s position. This way of understanding is in line with Tatham’s understanding 
(2010) about paradiplomacy with or without the state. In this thesis these positions have not 
been in focus and therefore not that interesting.  
 
 
10 For examples of channels used by regional offices Brussels see the work done by Trobbiani (2019) 
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The constructed analytical model of the study: 
 
A) Types of channels of influence that a legislative 
region’s regional office in Brussels might use to bypass the 
central government 
B) Types of channels of influence that the legislative 
region’s regional office in Brussels might use to go 
through the central government, ministries or central state 






Using extra-state channels of influence in politically 
prioritized matters leads to the possibility of bypassing the 




If the regional office bypasses the central government, in 
specific politically prioritized matters, certain means will 





Bypassing the member central government in specific 
prioritized matters leads to the possibility of influencing 
EU-institutions’, EU-actors’ and/or other member states’ 






Using intra-state channels of influence in prioritized 
matters leads to the possibility of working in tandem with 




If the regional office work in tandem with the central 
government, in specific politically prioritized matters, 
certain means will be applied, and specific circumstances 




Working in tandem with the member state/central 
government in specific prioritized matters leads to the 
possibility of influencing the central government’s position 
in those matters    
 
3.3. Method 
The thesis uses document analysis, with inspiration from the qualitative content analysis 
method (Drisko 2015), when analysing the documents. The advantage of using content analysis 
is to analyse subjects and social phenomenon in is its non-invasive nature, in contrast to 
simulating social experiences or collecting survey answers.  
 
My take-off of the study will be deductive – meaning that through an analytical framework 
based on theory and the research problem, I will analyse a number of documents on EU matters 
from the Åland Government and the Åland office in Brussels in order to answer the research 
questions, and in the end say something general that can fulfil the aim of the thesis.  
 
Through systematically label and categorize the content of the texts in the documents, I will be 
able to analyse patterns of content qualitatively and analyse meanings of content within texts. 
Qualitative content analysis uses a set of techniques that systematically analyse different kind 
of texts, not only addressing manifest content but also the themes and core ideas found in the 
texts being analysed as primary content (Drisko 2015, pp. 82-85; Mayring 2010). I will conduct 
my qualitative content analysis with inspiration from the ’structuring’ analytical procedure 
18 
(Titscher et al, 2000, ch 5, p. 8). The meaning is to find a structure (or reconstruct) from the 
document, define codes, construct categories and try to find latent contents (Titscher et al, 2000, 
ch 5). The meaning is to indicate the presence of interesting, meaningful pieces of content. 
The constructed sub-categories and its descriptions and meanings – that will be organized into 
two separate columns under separate main categories – will form the primary content when 
answering the research questions. The second research question will then benefit from a third 
constructed category used in the content analysis that have specifically grouped the themes and 
core ideas from a holistic viewpoint of the material, trying to find arguments that supports either 
category A or category B. I have systematically read through the documents. During the reading 
I extracted the codes which I interpreted to be connected to either Category A or B based on 
the analytical framework. After that I grouped the codes, themes and ideas in constructed sub-
categories. In the coding I have tried to include as many codes as possible that I could find 
related to either main category, irrespectively if the code or meaning was mentioned several 
times or only one time. The reason is that a code can be equally important even though it is only 
mentioned one time in a text. The codes could be just a couple of words to smaller and larger 
sentences depending on its context and meaning. Importantly, the context of the codes needs to 
be included when extracting the codes.   
3.4. Material 
The research questions in the introduction will be answered by using the following material 1) 
reports produced by the special adviser on EU affairs at the Åland office in Brussels, and 2) 
annual external reports by the Åland Government to the the Åland Parliament. The former 
documents have been gathered electronically from the website of the Åland Parliament 
(www.lagtinget.ax). The reports from the Åland Government’s Special Adviser in EU affairs, 
have been sent to the author by e-mail11. The reports from the Åland Government includes EU-
issues of priority the coming year and a report about the previous year’s work on EU-matters. 
The reports are more or less about 30 pages long (excluding content not dealing with EU affairs) 
and were produced from years 2015 to 2020.  The report from the special adviser on EU affairs 
on the other hand are more informal and takes the form of some kind of intelligence reports 
with analyses and information. The reports being studied are from September 2014 until 
December 2019. During this period a total of 33 reports have been produced which all have 
been included in my content analysis. The reports are differing in length from 3 pages to 7 
pages. The delimitation of the reports being studied is because of the limited availability of 
material, the expanded mandate of the Åland office to more actively pursue lobbying activities 
from 2014 and onwards and the thesis’ focus on the time period of Juncker commission (2015-
2019). 
        
What can be said about the differences between the two types of reports being studied? First, 
the language in the special adviser’s reports is less bureaucratic than the official reports of the 
Åland Government. Implicitly, one can notice there are parts in the reports that originate from 
informal discussions with officials at Finnish Permanent Representation to the EU and perhaps 
from partners and informal contacts. The special adviser’s reports are more analytical and focus 
on describing more in detail the working processes, events and timetables of the legislative 
processes, and initiatives and proposals of interest at the EU-institutions. These reports as are 
 
11 All documents – included with all the highlighted codes that were used in the analysis – can be obtained from 
the author of this thesis. 
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also in great detail taking care to outline the positions of other member states, the positions of 
the Finnish authorities and also the Åland Government’s positions. There is also a focus on 
trilogue negotiations between the EP, the Council and the Commission. In the special adviser’s 
reports, more care is taken to juxtapose Åland’s positions with that of the Finnish Government 
or the positions of the responsible Finnish ministry. This is done in order to know if there will 
a be a need to negotiate with the responsible Finnish authorities and perhaps present the Åland 
position in the Council meetings and in order decide which channels of influence that should 
be used. The Åland Government’s reports on the other hand is more descriptive in general and 
also describes in more detail and try to hammer out, the Åland positions in different EU-matters 
of interest.  
It is a clear focus on the intra-state channels of influence in the special adviser’s reports. While 
the descriptions of the working methods and intra-state channels of influence in some specific 
instances are in more detail in the special adviser’s reports than in the Åland Government 
reports, it is a bit surprising that descriptions of channels of influence in use and how the 
Government of Åland and the Åland Office works to influence policy- and decision-making in 
EU institutions are more vividly presented in the reports written by the Åland Government 





4. Result  
Firs it can be mentioned that the main functional channel of contact directly between Åland and 
the EU-institutions12 is the Åland office in Brussels headed by a special adviser (or councillor) 
in EU affairs. Additionally, quite often the special adviser is assisted by an intern at the office. 
The special adviser is appointed by the Åland Government. but is assigned – as is the whole 
Åland office – to the Permanent Representation of the Republic of Finland to the European 
Union in Brussels. The special adviser is thus embedded in the Finnish national representation, 
is accredited to the Council, and an official member of the Foreign Ministry.  
 
The Åland office monitors the legislative process of matters of interest, reports back to the 
Government of Åland (GoÅ), works actively to promote and inform the Åland Government’s 
positions to the EU-institutions and other relevant actors already during the preparation and 
processing of initiatives, creates and maintains relevant networks, and perform lobbying 
activities in various instances (Ålands landskapsregering (ÅLR) 2020, p. 25). Besides actively 
presenting the positions of the GoÅ at EU institutions13, it is very often mentioned that the GoÅ 
(including the Åland office) follows matters and monitors them actively14. Implicitly, and 
sometimes more obvious, in the texts analysed, I conclude that this general strategy is pursued 
in order to activate influence through the channels at hand if the political interests of the GoÅ, 
or the economic or social interests of the Åland community, are threatened (see e.g. ÅLR 2018 
pp. 30, 33, 41). Another quite clear feature of the Åland office and the GoÅ’s external priorities, 
is the limited resources at hand and the emphasis that is put on the political priorities (see e.g. 
ÅLR 2019, p 19). There is no way that the GoÅ and the Åland office can follow every potential 
matter of interest, so clear priorities need to be done.  
 
In light of the conducted document analysis it is quite straightforward (present in all analysed 
docments) that the main task of the Åland office is to follow politically prioritized matters in 
the EU-institutions, gather information about those matters, analyse it and report downstreams 
to the GoÅ. This finding is in line what scholars such as Keating et al. (2015, p. 453) have 
argued. The information that is gathered usually includes such aspects as the processes, 
timetables as well as the positions of the GoÅ, various EU-institutions, the Government of 
Finland (GoF) and that of other Member States (MS)15. Special focus is given to the GoÅ 
positions vis-a-vis the Finnish positions if there is a discrepancy between the two16. The intra-
state channels through the GoF and the Finnish Permanent Representation is almost always 
present in prioritized issues and political important subjects, while extra-state channels mostly 
are used as an important complement in certain political significant cases17. The fact that the 
special adviser of the Åland office is accredited to the Council shines through most of the 
material being studied. Thus, the intra-state channels are central to the mission of the Åland 
office and a mainstay in prioritized matters and are almost never abandoned. The extra-state 
 
12 Other contact points in Brussels are a politically appointed Ålandic special assistant to the Finnish MEP 
representing the Swedish People’s Party in the European Parliament, and also (unregularly) secondments of 
officials from the Åland Government to EU institutions (mostly the Commission).  
13 ”[...] a greater emphasis [...] to drive the GoÅ’s positions at the institutions of the EU” (ÅLR 2016, p. 14). 
14 “[i]mportant to keep on monitoring the important [fishing] quotas” (ÅO-report 2014 September, p.1) 
15 See for instance ÅO-report 2019 September, p. 3 
16 ”PL drives the issue that the ban against drift-netting [drivgarnsfiske’] in the Baltic Sea should easen up, 
which FI, SE, DK and EE are against. The GoÅ’s deviating position was announced [...] at the working group 
meeting at the Council” (ÅO-report 2017 March, p. 3) 
17 See for instance ÅO-report 2019 May p. 4 & ÅLR 2015, p. 29  
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channels instead are used as a perfect complement in more general political aims of the GoÅ, 
when the Åland-case is presented, or when their most political salient issues are on the GoÅ 
agenda18.  
4.1. Bypassing the central government 
  
A) Extra-state channels of influence in use that the Åland office (ÅO) in Brussels might apply to bypass the GoF 
The following extra-state channels have been confirmed in document analysis to be in use, however it has not confirmed in the 
data if they have been used in any specific politically prioritized matter:   
- Creating and maintaining contacts and networks with representatives from other legislative regions and organizations from 
other MS within the CoR in order to pursue issues of interest for the GoÅ (ÅLR 2015, pp. 10-11 & ÅLR 2017, p. 17) 
- Organizing special events for invited guests in Brussels, e.g. the celebration of the day of the Åland self-rule (ÅLR 2017, p. 17)  
- The special adviser of the ÅO participate in the REGLEG (ÅLR 2015, p. 39) 
- The special adviser of the ÅO is a member and takes part in the Subsidiarity Expert Group of the CoR (ÅLR 2017, p. 17) 
- Spreading Åland culture in Brussels; the Åland office participate in the network the Nordic Culture Committee, which works to 
shed light on Nordic culture in Brussels through joint Nordic cultural activities 19 (ÅLR 2020, p. 25). 
 
Channels that have been confirmed to be used in politically prioritized matters leading to bypassing, or partial 
bypassing, of the central government: 
- Cooperation and contacts with MEPs and political parties of the European Parliament (EP) (example of issue: lobbying in the 
EP for accepting snuff in the EU/Åland (the new tobacco directive)) (ÅLR 2015, pp. 12, 30; ÅLR 2014, p. 10; ÅLR 2018, p. 24) 
- Working to put on the agenda of the EP subjects of Åland interest (example of issue: arguing for the re-arrangement of MEP-
places so that legislative regions would attain a MEP-place in the EP) (ÅLR 2014, p. 10) 
- Presenting and circulating GoÅ position/expert papers and letters to politicians and actors at the EU-level (example of issue: 
the Finland’s and Åland’s fishing quotas in the Baltic Sea) (ÅLR 2015, pp. 12, 30; ÅLR 2020, p. 25; ÅO-reports 2014 
September & October; ÅLR 2019, p. 28; ÅLR 2018, p. 28) 
- Cooperation and contact with industry interest organisations that are active at the EU level (example of issue: cooperation with 
the Shipowner’s Association of Finland in the area of maritime shipping) (ÅO-reports 2014 October & November) 
- Organizing and taking part actively in seminars and conferences (example of issue: promoting the Development and 
sustainability agenda for Åland) (ÅO-reports 2019 January March & May) 
- Direct (both formal and informal) contacts with officials at the Commission or representatives of other regions or MS (example 
of issue: promoting change in the EU copyright law easing geo-blocking of national TV-channels online) (ÅLR 2015, pp. 12, 
18; ÅLR 2016, p. 19; ÅO-report 2015 January) 
- Organizing official meetings between Åland political representatives (e.g. ministers of the GoÅ) and politicians (MEPs) or 
other important persons or partners in Brussels (example of issues: arguing for the re-arrangement of MEP-places and promoting 
change in the EU copyright law) (ÅLR 2020, pp. 31-32; ÅLR 2016, p. 19) 
- Creating and using ad-hoc groups and networks of cooperating partners in certain joint matters of interest (example of issue: 
lobbying for change in the EU copyright law easing geo-blocking of national TV-channels online) (ÅLR 2018, p. 21, 24) 
- Using EU-wide forums in order to promote certain important political goals, values and activities of the GoÅ (example of 
issue: actively trying (and then successfully managed) to win the European Sustainability Award 2019) (ÅLR 2020, pp 24, 41; 
ÅO-reports 2019 January, March & May; ÅLR 2018, p. 3; ÅLR 2019, p. 3)  
- Representing the GoÅ the special adviser of the Åland office is a member of the Regions4 network (example of issue: 
promoting and developing the Development and sustainability agenda for Åland) (ÅLR 2020, p. 59) 
- Gaining access to important future forums, such as the Conference on the future of the EU, in order to try to affect the agenda 
(ÅLR 2020, p. 32; ÅO-report 2020 March) 
 
 
18 See for instance ÅLR 2015, p. 29 & ÅO-report March 2018, p. 1 
19 It consists of representatives from the Embassy of Finland, the Finnish Cultural Institute, the Danish Embassy, 
the Danish Cultural Institute, the Faroe Islands Representation, the Greenland Representation, the Iceland 
embassy, the Norwegian representation and the Swedish embassy 
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If the regional office bypasses the central government, in specific politically prioritized matters, 
certain means will be applied, and specific circumstances will be present (the “how”-question). 
According to the document analysis, bypassing of the central government has occurred by 
means of;  
A1) Lobbying and creating influence in the EP20. The Åland office has a well-worked 
network and good contacts in the EP. Regular cooperation with relevant MEPs and political 
groups of the EP (the ALDE-group) during the period being studied. There is cooperation with 
both Finnish21 and other MS’ MEPs depending on the subject in hand. Through dialogue with 
MEPs, the GoÅ has the opportunity to influence the political process within the EP in favour 
of the interests of the GoÅ. It can be noted that the most frequent cooperation with a MEP is 
with Nils Torvalds of the Swedish People’s Party22.  
A2) Forwarding the positions of the GoÅ to relevant political players and EU-
institutions 23 . The Åland office (together with the GoÅ) regularly forwards the GoÅ’s 
positions (sometimes through position/expert papers) and letters to actors, EU-institutions and 
partners within its EU-network, including MEPs, EP’s rapporteurs and shadow rapporteurs and 
political groups in the EP.   
A3) Organizing or taking part as speaker in seminars or conferences24 where the Åland 
case, or high-profile politically important goals, in different prioritized matters are presented 
and discussed.    
A4) Forming direct (both formal and informal) contacts and dialogues with officials at 
the Commission25  in order to affect proposals, initiatives and decisions processed in the 
Commission as well as presenting positions of the ÅG, but also in order to organize meetings 
for politicians from Åland.  
A5) Creating and using ad-hoc groups/networks/alliances with cooperating partners26 
(including other sub-state regions and interest organisations) that have the same aim in trying 
to affect the processing of initiatives and decisions and other legal and political processes in the 
EU-institutions concerned (e.g. the EP, the Council and the Commission).  
A6) Organizing and setting up official meetings27 between Åland political representatives 
(e.g. GoÅ ministers) and politicians (especially MEPs) and Commissions representatives, or 
other important persons or partners in Brussels depending on the issues at hand.  
 
20 ÅO-reports 2015 January & May; ÅO-report 2016 April; ÅO-report 2018 January; ÅO-report 2019 
September; ÅLR 2015, p. 12 
21 Note that cooperation with MEPs that are in same party as the central government, or otherwise in tandem 
with any of the parties of the central government, is defined as an intra-state channel 
22 ÅLR 2018, pp. 27-28 
23 ÅLR 2019, p. 28; ÅLR 2020, p. 32; ÅLR 2020, p. 59; ÅO-report 2017 September 
24 ÅLR 2019, p. 32 
25 ÅLR 2018, p. 24; ÅLR 2019, p. 32; ÅLR 2020, p. 26; ÅO-report 2016 April; ÅO-reports 2017 September & 
November; ÅLR 2014, pp. 31-32 
26 ÅO-reports 2017 September & November; ÅLR 2018, p. 21, 24 
27 ÅLR 2020, pp. 31-32; ÅLR 2016, p. 19 
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A7) Promoting certain important political goals, values and activities of the GoÅ and the 
Åland community at the EU-arena28 and at forums (such as taking part in European awards) 
for the purpose of putting the Åland Islands on the map and influencing actors at the EU-level 
in matters of political interest.     
A8) Informal advocacy work at an early stage29 in the legislative process in the EP or in the 
processing of a Commission initiatives as well with regard to future policy priorities of the 
Commission. It is argued that the work of trying to influence decision-making an early stage is 
a useful for the GoÅ even though the result of active influence is negative, as it will benefit 
from the network that has been built up. 
A9) Trying to get access to important forums at the EU-level30, such as the Conference on 
the future of the EU, in order to try to affect the agenda of the future of EU (thus meaning 
stronger formal channels of influence for legislative regions, democracy and multi-level 
governance). 
A10) Cooperating with specific industry interest organisations 31 . The Åland office 
sometimes cooperate with the Finnish Shipowner’s Association, for expert support and to find 
work-able compromises for the Åland maritime industry in the Council in industry-specific 
issues (e.g. in the area of maritime shipping). 
A11) Membership and engagement in European networks32. Since 2019, the GoÅ has been 
a member of the Regions4 network, the purpose of which is to make visible and support the 
work of regional governments in biodiversity, climate change and sustainable development. 
The special adviser of the Åland Office in Brussels acts as the network's contact person as long 
as biodiversity, climate change and sustainable development are matters that the provincial 
government intends to prioritize at EU level. 
In the analytical model I suggest that bypassing the central government in specific prioritized 
matters leads to the possibility of influencing EU-institutions’, EU-actors and/or other member 
state central governments’ position in those matters. In the studied material there are indications 
of two influence-creating processes, where the Åland office has (at least in part) bypassed the 
central government, that might have led to some sort of influence on the positions of the 
Commission. First, we have the lobbying and promotion work in connection with the 
Development and sustainability agenda for Åland. The GoÅ and the Åland Office had in 2018 
direct dialogues with European institutions with regard to EU’s implementation of the UN 
Agenda 2030. The Åland agenda was presented on several occasions (e.g. seminars) at the EU-
level in 2018 and 2019. In April 2019 the Development and sustainability agenda for Åland 
was named the winner the Commission’s European Sustainability Award 2019 (in the category 
for communities up to 100,000 people). As a result of the award, interest in Åland's 
development and sustainability work at the EU-level has increased plentiful, showcased by the 
presentations of Åland’s sustainability work that was held in a variety of international contexts. 
Winning of European awards is a type good-will channel that has been used extensively to 
 
28 ÅLR 2020, p. 59; ÅLR 2018, p. 3; ÅLR 2019, p. 3 
29 ÅLR 2020, p. 26; ÅLR 2015, p. 12 
30 ÅLR 2020, p. 32; ÅO-report 2020 March 
31 Depending on the subject, this is a channel that might lead to either bypassing the central government or 
working in tandem with it.       
32 ÅLR 2020, p. 59 
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promote Åland political goals and the Åland lifestyle externally33. The second indication of 
some sort of influence on the Commission was when the Åland office early on in the legislative 
process tried to bring about extensive changes in the EU copyright law that would, among other 
things, open up the possibility to take away geo-blocking of online content from national TV 
broadcasters34. Positions was presented to the Commission, the EP and to relevant actors at the 
EU-level. During a period of several years, the Åland office, partnered together with the 
Commission and worked for a higher level of ambition compared to the majority of MS and 
formed together with an ad-hock alliance of regions and organisations in order to influence the 
processing, negotiations and decision-making of the matter within the EU institutions35.  
4.2. In tandem with the central government 
 
B) Intra-state channels of influence that the Åland office might apply to work in tandem with the GoF, ministries or 
central state authorities aligned with the central government 
The following intra-state channels of influence that are in tandem with central government have been confirmed in the document 
analysis to be in use in politically prioritized matters: 
- Cooperation with Finnish MEPs36 (example of issue: pursue compensation for damages done by seals and cormorants on 
fishing) (ÅLR 2014, p. 10; ÅLR 2015, p. 12; ÅO-report 2019 September) 
- Accreditation to the Council trough the Finnish Permanent Representation, thus gaining informal chance to discuss matters 
with officials of the Permanent Representation (in general all prioritized matters that pass the Council) (visible consistently 
throughout the material, see for instance ÅLR 2014, pp. 10-11, 22, 24; ÅLR 2015, p. 30; ÅLR 2018, p. 3; ÅLR 2019, p. 22, 32; 
ÅLR 2020, p. 24, 26; ÅO-report 2015 January; ÅO-report 2017 January, March & September) 
- Taking part and presenting the GoÅ positions together with GoF-representative in those instances (e.g. working group 
meetings) when EU-institutions (most often the Council and sometimes the Commission) are processing subjects that are of 
interest of the GoÅ (example of issue: the special adviser actively participated the work of the Agenda 2030 working-group in 
the Council) (ÅLR 2014, pp. 11, 22, 32; ÅLR 2015, pp. 12, 22, 32; ÅLR 2016, p. 36; ÅLR 2019, p. 21; ÅLR 2020, p. 41; ÅO-
report 2016 October; ÅO-report 2017 January) 
- Actively following, and sometimes taking part, in the presentation of the Finnish positions at negotiating- and decision-making 
meetings of the Council (applies in general to all politically prioritized matters that pass the Council, especially in those matters 
where the GoÅ’s position shall be presented) (ÅLR 2014, pp. 10-11, 24; ÅLR 2015, p. 30; ÅLR 2019, p. 22; ÅLR 2020, p. 26; 
ÅO-report 2014 September & October; ÅO-report 2015 May; ÅO-report 2016 October; ÅO-report 2019 December) 
- Cooperation between officials of the GoÅ, Åland office and responsible Finnish ministries to reach compromises in issues of 
importance for Finland and Åland (example of issue: maritime shipping, the EU’s tax code and tax-border issues) in the 
processing of proposals in the Council (ÅLR 2014, p. 32; ÅO-report 2014 October; ÅLR 2015, p. 22; ÅO-report 2016 June; 
ÅO-report 2017 January & March)  
- Cooperation between officials of the GoÅ, Åland office and responsible Finnish authority (e.g. the Customs) to reach 
compromises in issues of importance for Finland and Åland (example of issue: trying to keep or improve the current principles 
when handling the Åland tax border (the union’s customs code)) in the processing of implementing and delegated acts in the 
Council and in the Commission (ÅLR 2015, p. 32)    
- Cooperation between officials of the GoÅ, Åland office and GoF/responsible ministry in certain issues in meetings and 
working/decision processes in the Commission (example of issue: meeting with TAXUD regarding new customs laws) (ÅLR 
2016, p. 36) 
- Promoting certain important political goals, values and activities of the GoÅ towards the GoF representatives at the EU-level 
in order to affect the agenda of the GoF at the Council (example of issue: the work of the GoÅ to influence the the program of 
the Finnish 6-month presidency of the Council (in 2019)). (ÅLR 2014, p. 10; ÅO-report 2018 March; ÅLR 2020, pp. 24, 26).  
 
33 ÅLR 2020, pp 24, 41; ÅO-reports 2019 January, March & May; ÅLR 2018, p. 3; ÅLR 2019, p. 3 
34 So that it would be possible for Åland consumers of Swedish cable TV to also watch the content online. 
35 ÅLR 2018, p. 21, 24; ÅLR 2016, p. 19; ÅLR 2015, p. 18; ÅO-report 2016 April 
36 Note that cooperation with MEPs that are in same party as the central government, or otherwise in tandem 
with any of the parties of the central government, is defined as an intra-state channel 
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If the regional office work in tandem with the central government, in specific politically 
prioritized matters, certain means will be applied, and specific circumstances will be present 
(the “how”-question). According to the document analysis, work in tandem with the central 
government has occurred by means of;  
B1) Cooperating with Finnish MEPs37, i.e. those MEPs that are associated with the Finnish 
Government (e.g. belong to any of the political parties of the GoF) or pursue matters that are in 
line with GoF’s position. For instance, the GoÅ and the Åland office cooperated with the MEP 
of the Swedish People’s Parrty when working to pursue duly compensation for damages done 
by seals and cormorants on fishing38. 
B2) Accreditation to the Council39 and access to the Foreign Ministry trough the Finnish 
Permanent Representation. The accreditation gain access to internal resources, information, 
contacts and meetings in the Council as well as gaining access to informally discuss matters 
with officials of the permanent representation office.  
B3) Taking part in meetings within the Council and other EU-institutions40. The GoÅ’s 
ability to influence the Council’s position in a specific matter is closely tied to the process of 
hammering out the GoF’s position at the Council41. Therefore, the GoÅ back home actively 
participate in the national preparation of Finland's position. However, when a common position 
cannot not be reached, or when the GoÅ has a specific standpoint in an prioritized issue, the 
GoÅ’s positions, at the request of the GoÅ, should be presented at Council meetings in parallel 
with the national position presented by the GoF representative. If the special adviser is not able 
to present the position, the GoF-representative should – and in those cases the special adviser 
is able to control that the request is fulfilled42. The special adviser of the Åland Office can take 
part (with due respect of the working methods of the institution) and present its positions 
together with the representative from the GoF in those instances (e.g. working group meetings) 
when EU-institutions (most often the Council) are processing subjects that are of interest of the 
GoÅ and the GoÅ requests to take part43. The representative of the GoÅ has however no 
independent right to express the GoÅ opinion regardlessly of the Finnish positions. The GoÅ’s 
positions in the Council can be presented orally during Council-meetings and then also sent in 
as a written comment44. The special adviser of the Åland Office, on request, can follow (if 
possible according to working routines of the Council) negotiating- and decision-making 
meetings (including meetings of ministers) of the Council, however the Finnish Government 
 
37 ÅLR 2014, p. 10; ÅLR 2015, p. 12; ÅLR 2016, p. 14; ÅLR 2017, p. 17; ÅLR 2018, p 24.; ÅLR 2019, p. 20; 
ÅLR 2020, p. 26 
38 ÅO-reports 2019 January, March, May & September 
39 Visible consistently throughout the material, see for instance ÅLR 2014, pp 11, 22; ÅLR 2015, p. 12; ÅLR 
2016, p. 14; ÅLR 2017, p. 17; ÅLR 2018, 23-24; ÅLR 2019, pp. 19-20; ÅLR 2020, p. 24-26; ÅO-report 2014 
October; ÅO-report 2015 January; ÅO-report 2017 September 
40 ÅLR 2014, pp 11, 24; ÅLR 2015, pp. 12, 30; ÅLR 2016, p. 14 
41 ÅLR 2020, p. 26 
42 ÅLR 2020, p. 26 
43 ÅO-report 2016 October; ÅO-report 2019 December; ÅLR 2020, p. 25; ÅLR 2019, p. 20; ÅLR 2018, p. 24; 
ÅLR 2017, 16 
44 ÅO-report 2014 September 
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representative/representative of the responsible ministry decides how Finland uses its vote in 
the Council45. 
B4) Cooperation between officials at the EU-level46. Cooperation between officials and 
experts of the GoÅ, the Åland office, and responsible Finnish ministries and authorities to reach 
compromises and common goals in joint issues of importance for Finland and Åland 
respectively during the processing of proposals and processing of implementing and delegated 
acts in the Council and in the Commission, as well as in meetings with Commission officials.  
B5) Influencing the national political agenda in the Council47. Through promoting certain 
important political goals, values and activities at the GoF-level and at the Finnish representation 
office, the GoÅ and the Åland office can influence the political agenda of the GoF in the 
Council. This strategy was adopted when purposeful work of the Åland office and the GoÅ put 
the sustainability agenda on the program of the Finnish 6-month presidency of the Council and 
also on the common 18-month program with the other two next-coming chairmanship countries.  
In the analytical model I suggest that working in tandem with the member state and the central 
government in specific prioritized matters leads to the possibility of influencing the central 
government’s position in those matters    
In the studied material there are indications (such as maritime shipping, sustainability and Åland 
tax-border issues) where the position of the GoÅ and the work of the Åland office has to some 
degree been influential in affecting the position of the central government in the Council. 
However, the lobbying of environment and sustainability matters and the promoting the 
sustainability work of the GoÅ stands out48. From the onset the GoÅ and the Åland office 
expressed its desire to establish a civic-anchored and sustainable vision for the EU as one of 
Finland's priorities during their presidency of the Council49. Moreover, as a result of the work 
together with GoF in the Council, on behalf of Finland's Permanent Representation to the EU, 
the Åland office conducted a survey of the European Commission's political will to prioritize 
sustainable development during the Finnish Presidency in the autumn of 201950. I argue that 
the Åland office, together with the GoÅ, promoted the agenda of sustainability and democracy 
during the forming the program of the Finnish presidency at the Council for the purpose of 
putting the Åland Islands on the European map and influencing actors at the EU-level in matters 
of political interest of the GoÅ. The end-result was positive as sustainability and 
implementation of the Agenda 2030 was one of the foundations in the program of the Finnish 
presidency. As part of the work on the Development and Sustainability Agenda for Åland, the 
GoÅ and Åland office actively participated in the Finnish presidency’s work in sustainable 
development at EU level; for instance, by participating in the work of the Council's working 
group for Agenda 203051.   
 
45 ÅLR 2014, p. 11; ÅO-report 2015 May; ÅO-report 2016 October 
46 ÅLR 2014, p. 32; ÅO-report 2014 October; ÅLR 2015, p. 22; ÅO-report 2016 June; ÅO-report 2017 January 
& March; ÅLR 2016, p. 36 ÅLR 2015, p. 32 
47 ÅLR 2018, p. 3; ÅLR 2019, p. 21 
48 ÅLR 2019, p. 32 
49 ÅLR 2020, p. 26 
50 ÅLR 2020, p. 24 
51 ÅLR 2019, p. 21 
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5. Conclusions 
The research questions that this thesis set out to answer was:  
1) By differentiating between intra-state and extra-state channels of influence, how is the 
Åland office in Brussels in certain politically prioritized matters a) bypassing the central 
government and b) work in tandem with central government at the Brussels arena?    
2) Can it be perceived (through any obvious or underlying meanings) whether the analysed 
material suggests any propensity of the Åland office to concentrate on either the strategy 
of bypassing or working in tandem with the central government? 
 
When aggregated and summarized, the result of the analysis shows us that bypassing of the 
central government has occurred by using a set of extra-state channels of influence and by such 
means as; 
- lobbying and creating influence in the European Parliament,  
- forwarding the positions of the Åland Government to relevant political players and EU-
institutions,  
- organizing or taking part as speaker in seminars or conferences  
- forming direct (both formal and informal) contacts and dialogue with officials at the 
Commission,  
- creating and using ad-hoc groups/networks/alliances with cooperating partners,  
- organizing and setting up official meetings with high-profile officials and politicians, 
- promoting certain important political goals, values and activities of the Åland 
Government and the Åland community at the wider EU-arena,  
- informal advocacy work at an early stage,  
- trying to get access to new important forums at the EU-level,  
- cooperating with specific industry interest organisations52,  
- membership and engagement in European networks.  
When aggregated and summarized, the result of the analysis shows us that working in tandem 
with the central government has occurred by using a set of intra-state channels of influence and 
by such means as; 
- cooperating with Finnish MEPs and other Finnish actors that support the positions of 
the national government at the EU-level, 
- accreditation to the Council, with all informal and formal advantages,   
- presenting positions, taking part and engaging in meetings and in the processing of 
matters of interest in the Council and other EU-institutions (the latter if in cooperation 
with officials from national authorities),  
- cooperation between Åland and Finnish officials at the EU-level,  
- influencing the national political agenda in the Council. 
Concerning the question whether it is suggested in the material being studied if there is any 
propensity of the Åland office to concentrate on either the strategy of bypassing or working in 
tandem with the central government the following can be concluded from the result. The intra-
state channels through the Government of Finland and the Finnish Permanent Representation 
in the Council is almost always present in prioritized issues and political important subjects, 
 
52 Depending on the subject and the position of the association, this is a channel that might lead to either 
bypassing the central government or working in tandem with it.       
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while extra-state channels mostly are used as an important complement in certain political 
significant cases. Extra-state channels at the EU-level are perhaps more in use (at the expense 
of intra-state channels) in matters that are connected to broad politically salient goals, such as 
supporting and promoting the Åland culture and way of life or the autonomy regime of Åland 
and its minority protection mechanisms. In this study it has been quite apparent that even though 
the Åland Government and the Åland office in Brussels to some degree has managed quite well 
to take from central state authorities a share of the monopoly of influencing European policy- 
and decision-making – and regularly bypasses the central government – it still the central 
government that has the significant formal power. This finding is in line with arguments from 
scholars such as Keating et al (2015) and Antunes & Magone (2020).  However, through the 
lens of the Åland office in Brussels, we can see how intense and advanced the interaction 
between EU and regional actors can become (Macneill et al. 2007, p. 413). But very few 
regional offices, with the backing of their governments, can aspire to individually influence EU 
decision-making. Instead regional offices use both bypassing paradiplomacy (using mainly 
extra-state channels without the state) and co-operative paradiplomacy (using mainly intra-state 
channels with the state) (Tatham 2010). In line with what Trobbiani (2019, p. 190) suggests, it 
seems as if when the Åland office is using extra-state channels not in tandem with the central 
government – despite the importance lobbying – the only way to achieve some positive results 
is to cooperate through networks (ad-hoc or permanent) with other regions and organisations in 
Brussels. The case with the Åland office, however, contradicts Trobbiani’s argument that 
lobbying in various networks are more important for regional offices than channels through the 
Member states’ Permanent Representations (Trobbiani 2019, p. 191). Importantly though, far 
from being mutually exclusive, bypassing and cooperation with the member state “actually 
represent merely two possible options available” to regional offices (Tatham 2010; p. 91). The 
case of the Åland office shows that those extra-state channels that are used - being less-
institutionalized, policy-specific cooperation – rather complements formal intra-state 
mechanisms of cooperation and interest representation. Yet, this conclusion should not be 
misunderstood to connect to Loughlin & Antunes’ (2020) ‘damp squib’-thesis about the state 
of regional influence in small unitary states. Instead, it is more in line with the findings of 
Bursens & De Blauwer (2018) regarding the use of extra-state and intra-state channels    
Interestingly, it seems as if the Åland office to some degree can influence the position of the 
Finnish state in the Council through its close integration and cooperation with the Finnish 
Permanent Representation of the EU. The Finnish position can then of course influence the 
standpoint of the Council in for example trialogues with the Parliament, the Commission and 
the Council. However, it is important to acknowledge that the Finnish bargaining-power in the 
Council is relatively low due to Finland’s comparatively small size and political power 
(Hyvärinen 2009).  
 
This thesis has set out to study a very small regional office where the "magic" (in terms of 
influence) happens and how a regional office actually works in "the real world" trying to 
make its voice heard. The Åland office in Brussels is apparently still highly appreciated by the 
Åland Government, as the political discussion is about expanding the office’s resources rather 
than the other way around (Självstyrelsepolitiska nämndens betänkande 1/2018-2019). The 
future may require the Åland Government to substantially increase its allocated resources to 
the office. In the wake of Brexit and in the light of the growing nationalism in many European 
countries, there is a stronger interest in a Europe of the regions (Ålands landskapsregering 
2015, p. 3), and more voices are heard that argue for increasing the formal role of the regions 
in the EU, but how this would be realized in practice is not clear. 
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